US expected to get around China’s export controls on gallium, an essential component for American military radar tech

The AN/SPY-6 is a three-dimensional radar to be deployed on the latest model of Arleigh Burke class of destroyers that use the Aegis combat system and are responsible for air and missile defence.

The AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR is also a 3D short and medium-range radar designed to detect objects such as uncrewed aerial systems, cruise missiles, air-breathing targets, rockets and artillery. These systems rely on gallium nitride (GaN) technology to support their antennas and other essential components that are difficult to substitute.

Eugene Gholz, an associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana in the US, said Beijing was in part aiming to disrupt the defence supply chain by countering the semiconductor export control, considering Washington’s “fear of vulnerability” as an opportunity to increase its leverage against the US.

“I think the way China hoped the gallium export controls would ‘work’ is by disrupting the US defence supply chain – annoying the United States in response to the United States annoying China by disrupting Chinese ability to import semiconductors,” Gholz said.

However, he said that while China’s export controls would cause a shift in the global gallium trade, its substantial influence in the defence supply chain would be limited as Washington found alternative sources.

“China’s export controls may shift around some of the patterns of trade … but they are unlikely to constrain the availability of gallium because substitute suppliers are available in the overall market,” Gholz said.

“There may be some temporary friction or slight cost increases as the market adjusts to actual enforcement of Chinese export controls.”

Bradley Martin, director of the Rand National Security Supply Chain Institute and senior policy researcher at the Rand Corporation, echoed the view.

“What’s most likely is that US companies, defence industry, its industrial base, and actors will say, ‘Well, we have to find a substitute for gallium, and we have to establish our own niche supplies’.”

Radar systems have again been the focus of geopolitical arm-wrestling as the US-China rivalry intensifies.

South Korea’s deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defenc missile defence system in 2016 drove Beijing to retaliate with economic sanctions as it insisted the radar system threatened China’s security interest.

In September, Raytheon, a major US aerospace and defence company, was awarded a US$412 million deal with Taiwan to upgrade and maintain surveillance radar amid increasing tensions between Beijing and Taipei. Beijing imposed sanctions on Raytheon in February for its involvement in Taiwan arms sales.

In June, Chinese scientists revealed the development of one of the most powerful radars in the world, capable of detecting ballistic missiles from 4,500km (2,800 miles) – far greater than conventional radars with a normal working range of a few hundred kilometres.

According to the US Geological Survey, the US does not have any domestic production of gallium and solely relies on imports.

In contrast, China accounted for more than 95 per cent of the world’s gallium production in 2020 and 2021. Some 53 per cent of US imports of the metal came from China between 2018 and 2021.

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