Why fears of a Chinese naval base at Pakistan’s Gwadar port are overblown

In the early 2000s, Pakistan began reaching out to China to help build a naval base at Gwadar. By 2005, Pakistan’s naval chief had envisioned it as the nation’s third naval base, complementing the Karachi base and the Jinnah base at Ormara.

Gwadar is seen as a probable location for a Chinese naval base due to its strategic position near the Strait of Hormuz and ability to host large warships. It is anticipated that Chinese navy warships will dock at Gwadar for repairs and replenishment, as they have in Karachi in the past. This would address China’s ability to sustain a fleet in the Indian Ocean and may allow Beijing access to regional maritime data.

However, to what extent will this potential be realised? Key considerations include the nature of China’s intelligence operations concerning US naval activities and whether Pakistan would allow the Chinese navy permanent access to its bases.

Intelligence gathering by Chinese entities or navy personnel at such facilities is hardly new. US Navy Lieutenant Commander Joseph McGinnis’ research highlighted the Karachi and Jinnah naval bases as primary choices for the Chinese navy due to their “superior repair, logistics, and military facilities”. If China were to use Pakistan-based facilities for overseas operations, these two bases would be prioritised.

Besides, Pakistan hosts most of its naval assets – much of them Chinese-supplied – at the Karachi and Jinnah bases. Chinese technicians have been present at the former for years and are likely to be at the latter too, given the relocation of strategic assets there since 2011.

Beijing would probably have been gathering intel on US naval activities in the Persian Gulf through its assets and personnel at these bases. If the US had reservations, it would have exercised its leverage over Pakistan to address them.

Additionally, such surveillance is hardly unique. Chinese firms operating ports in over 50 countries similarly monitor naval operations, according to Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert in their 2022 International Security article, “Pier competitor: China’s power position in global ports”.

Pakistan is likely to accept this trade-off in return for Chinese naval transfers, given the constraints on obtaining military equipment from the US and Europe. Islamabad aims to increase its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities not only against India but against terrorists, who have previously targeted Pakistan’s naval strategic assets.

The Pakistani cabinet’s recent nod towards renewing the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement with the US after its 2020 expiration indicates Islamabad’s interest in US military tech integrated with ISR features. If China offers similar tech, it might understandably want access for regional data collection.

Yet, this is vastly different from the Chinese navy deploying surveillance ships directly on the Pakistani coast. Currently, the Chinese navy primarily utilises its Djibouti base for noncombat and anti-piracy missions near the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, up to North Africa. Having a foothold in Pakistan’s southwestern shores would significantly aid operations extending to the Persian Gulf.

Islamabad has previously allowed port calls by the Chinese navy, including submarine visits. Pakistan’s chief of naval staff recently indicated an openness to more such visits, including from Chinese aircraft carriers.

Still, the primary role of the temporary deployment of Chinese navy personnel and warships on these bases has been to offer training to Pakistani navy officers and improve interoperability on Pakistan’s warships of Chinese origin. To date, the Chinese navy hasn’t established a consistent naval presence on Pakistani bases.

Pakistan would be wise to avoid granting the Chinese navy access to its bases for contingency operations, as this could one day translate into regional military actions or coercive diplomacy.