China tipped to keep Mali ties strictly economic as UN peacekeeping mission wraps up

Now, with the exit of French troops in 2022 and UN peacekeepers at the end of last year, the Malian junta is endearing itself to China and Russia, with the latter contributing troops or mercenaries under the Wagner Group, now known as the Africa Corps.

Meanwhile, China hosted a delegation in December which included Mali’s ministers of finance, commerce and foreign affairs. During their visit, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi promised Beijing would deepen cooperation with the African nation in education, training, medical care and agriculture.

Wang also said China would help implement more schemes such as the Mali Digital project and the African Solar Belt programme to “help promote the peace and development process in Mali”.

But although Malian junta leaders have approached China for both development assistance and help with conflict resolution, observers have said it is likely that Beijing will provide only non-military aid.

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“So far we are seeing Beijing reinforcing its diplomacy in Mali and expanding in various sectors,” said Lina Benabdallah, an associate professor in the politics and international affairs department at Wake Forest University in the US.

The pledge to bankroll Malian projects points to a key Chinese diplomatic approach to conflicts – preferring its long-standing policy of promoting economic development as a solution to most problems, and avoiding direct intervention in complex conflicts.

“We see more development projects and people-to-people relations, and the Chinese embassy in Mali posted about several education-related projects conducted in rural areas,” Benabdallah said. “I don’t think we are seeing a massive change of Chinese diplomacy in Mali; if anything, it might be gradual.”

In her recent study published by the Stimson Centre, Benabdallah argued that China seeks to avoid diplomatic entanglements with Western powers while protecting its economic and security interests.

“Focusing on non-military aspects such as development has the potential to create opportunities to add value,” she wrote in the study.

Her analysis showed the likelihood of Beijing being involved in mediation was high where Chinese commercial interests were high. This was the case in Darfur, Sudan, where China has oil and energy security interests.

Chinese peacekeeping troops have returned to China from Mali after the official end of the UN mission. Photo: 81.cn

China’s commercial interests in the Sahel countries – those south of the Sahara – have been limited. But it is making inroads into countries such as Niger, where Beijing has energy and mining interests.

While trade and investments by Chinese enterprises are growing in Mali, energy investments and trade relations have yet to bloom in significant ways in Chad and Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso only normalised relations with Beijing a few years ago.

David Shinn, a professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, said when it came to supporting mediation and dialogue in Africa, China talked a good game and did provide some financial support for other organisations, but its own efforts were strictly limited.

Shinn said except for UN peacekeeping operations, China did not engage its own personnel in active warfare in Africa, as the United States and France were willing to do. Nor did China have any interest in participating in a military response that was either led by or had significant involvement of a Western government.

“Consequently, I don’t envisage China trying to replace France in Mali or anywhere else in the Sahel,” Shinn said.

However, he said this was a task that Russia’s now Africa Corps was willing to do.

“It will be interesting to see if China is publicly supportive of Russia’s military intervention in Mali, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso and possibly Niger.”

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Benjamin Barton, an associate professor at the University of Nottingham’s Malaysia campus, said the conflict in the Sahel region was not China’s, in the sense that its involvement in the region had always been indirect or driven by economic interests.

“China has not been militarily involved in the Sahel since the region’s instability spiked after the collapse of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in 2011, unlike France, the European Union and the countries of the region themselves,” Barton said.

Barton said China neither had a strong anti-terror presence nor appeared to be involved in paramilitary activity.

And while China did have military-to-military exchanges with countries in the region, he said its footprint could be considered secondary in relation to countries such as the United States and France.

China is only ever going to have a diplomatic approach in seeking to help bring about a sustainable exit out of the conflict, Barton said, as Beijing was not willing to dispatch its military to foreign conflicts or get involved in a combat far from China.

“[China’s] involvement will likely mirror its diplomatic endeavours as seen in other hotspots revolving around promoting dialogue, raising the issue within relevant multilateral settings, outreach to both conflicting parties and offering economic sweeteners as drivers to fostering interaction among the warring parties.”

South China Morning Post